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Abstract—For a participant to play persuasive arguments in
a dialogue, s/he may create a model of the other participants.
This may include an estimation of what arguments the other
participants find believable, convincing, or appealing. The par-
ticipant can then choose to put forward those arguments that
have high scores in the desired criteria. In this paper, we
consider how we can crowd-source opinions on the believability,
convincingness, and appeal of arguments, and how we can use this
information to predict opinions for specific participants on the
believability, convincingness, and appeal of specific arguments.
We evaluate our approach by crowd-sourcing opinions from 50
participants about 30 arguments. We also discuss how this form
of user modelling can be used in a decision-theoretic approach
to choosing moves in dialogical argumentation.
I. INTRODUCTION
Persuasion is an activity that involves one party trying to
get another party to believe (or not believe) something or do
something (or not do something). Consider, for example, a
doctor convincing a patient to drink less, a road safety expert
persuading drivers to not text while driving, or an online safety
expert getting users of social media sites not to reveal too
much personal information. Hence, it is an important and
multifaceted human facility.
As computing becomes involved in every sphere of life, so
too is persuasion a target for applying computer-based solu-
tions. Persuasion technologies have come out of developments
in human-computer interaction research (see for example the
influential work by Fogg [1]) with a particular emphasis on
addressing the need for systems to help people make positive
changes to their behaviour, particularly in healthcare and
healthy life-styles. Interestingly, argumentation is not central
to the current manifestations of persuasion technologies [2].
Rather, there is an emphasis on either helping users to explore
their issues (e.g. game playing) or helping users once they are
persuaded to do something (e.g. diaries for recording calorie
intake for weight management).
To address the lack of explicit argumentation in persua-
sion technologies, we have been developing a framework for
persuasion in argumentation dialogues with an emphasis on
behaviour change applications [3]. A system (the persuader
running for example as an app) enters into a dialogue with a
user (the persuadee using the app) to persuade them to accept
a specific argument called the persuasion goal (e.g. eat more
fruit because it is healthy for you). A dialogue is a sequence of
moves where the possible moves at each step of the dialogue
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depend on a protocol and may include positing an argument,
asking a query, answering a query, and more. We assume that
a dialogue concerns an argument graph, i.e. a directed graph
where each node denotes an argument and each arc denotes
an attack as proposed by Dung [4]. In Figure 1, we give some
examples of arguments in the form of such a graph.
By choosing appropriate arguments to present to the user,
the system may raise the user’s belief in the persuasion
goal. However, for the system, there is a problem of how
to communicate with the user and get his/her arguments,
which is necessary in order to support a fair and frank
persuasion dialogue. We assume the system cannot understand
arguments presented in natural language, given the complexity
of processing arguments in free text. Hence, the interface with
the user is restricted. One solution is for the system to give a
menu of arguments that the user might believe, and the user
presents agreement/disagreement in each argument by giving
it a score (as in a Likert scale [5]). This score is in the unit
interval and denotes the belief the user has in the argument.
Example 1. Suppose the system gives argument A in Figure 1
as its persuasion goal. It is aware of two potential counterar-
guments B and C. So it presents these in a menu, and asks the
user for his/her degree of belief in them. If the user declares
belief greater than 0.5 in B (resp. C), then the system presents
D and/or E (resp. F) with the aim of lowering the user’s belief
in B (resp. C) and increasing the user’s belief in A.
Asking the user about which arguments s/he believes allows
for a dialogue to be tailored to the user. However, a user might
be asked too many questions, which might cause the user to
disengage. To address this, we can construct a user model
that contains information such as the belief that the user has
in some of the arguments. The system can then harness the
user model to choose its moves, as in the next example.
Example 2. Suppose the system gives argument A in Figure
1 as its persuasion goal, and presents B and C in a menu.
Also suppose the user expresses belief of 0.9 in B and belief
of 0.1 in C. Suppose the system does not want to present both
D and E as a counterargument to B, and it wants to choose the
argument that is most likely to be believed. Also, suppose it
does not want to ask another question. If it has a user model,
that says for example that D has belief of 0.8, and E has belief
of 0.1, then the system will present D.
So far we have focused on belief in arguments as beliefs are
a primary feature of theoretical models of behaviour change.
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A = Giving up
smoking will be
good for your health
B = My appetite will increase and
so I will put on too much weight
C = My anxiety will increase and
so I will lose too much weight
D = You can join a healthy eating
course to help you manage your weight
E = You can take up running
to burn the extra calories.
F = You can join a yoga class to help you
relax, and thereby manage your anxiety
Fig. 1: Example of argument graph for persuasion. Each node denotes an argument, and each arc denotes one argument
attacking another argument. The argument graph contains the arguments known (but not necessarily believed) by the system.
Argument A could be a persuasion goal and so B and C are potential counterarguments for the user.
There is substantial evidence in the behaviour change literature
that shows the importance of the beliefs of a persuadee in
affecting the likelihood that the persuadee will be persuaded
by a specific behaviour change intervention (see for example
the review by Ogden [6]). In behaviour change, beliefs concern
a variety of issues including: causes of the healthcare problem;
risks to the agent from the healthcare problem; benefits to the
agent from resolving the healthcare problem; opportunities for
the agent for resolving the healthcare problem; capacity of an
agent for resolving the healthcare problem; and the views of
the agent’s family of the healthcare problem.
To represent and reason with belief in arguments, we can
use the epistemic approach to probabilistic argumentation [8]–
[11]. Applying this approach to modelling persuadee’s beliefs
in arguments has produced methods for updating beliefs during
a dialogue [12]–[14], for efficient representation and reasoning
with the probabilistic user model [15], and for harnessing
decision rules for optimizing the choice of arguments based
on the user model [16]. These developments offer a well-
understood theoretical and computationally viable framework
for applications such as behaviour change.
However, so far we have not considered how the user
models could be acquired (i.e. how we can efficiently and
effectively obtain information from users about their opinions
in order to be able to construct user models). There is also
the question of whether we should continue to focus on
belief in arguments, or whether there are other dimensions
that we could consider for evaluating arguments, such as the
convincingness and appeal of the arguments.
The ability to put forward convincing arguments is vital
to a persuasion system, and as observed in [6], this is not
necessarily the same as putting forward believable arguments.
For example, while a patient may very well believe the doctor
that smoking damages his health and that it would be best for
him to quit, it does not necessarily mean that he is convinced
enough to actually do it. Argumentation systems also often
do not consider how appealing a given argument is to the
persuadee, which is perhaps surprising given the fact that
presenting arguments that appeal to people is a vital aim of
many product advertisements as well as of various politicians.
For example, people may find arguments that are in line with
their personal views to be more appealing than those that
contrast them strongly. By focusing purely on the correctness
of the arguments, we often do not reflect on how the per-
suadees are going to feel about the information we provide
them. Furthermore, such a focus has led to the development
of software for persuasion which, despite being correct in the
dialectical argumentation sense, has been considered offensive
and judgmental by its users [17].
To address these issues, we investigate empirical methods
for developing the user model. We consider how we can collect
opinions from users on arguments, and how we can predict
opinions on a variety of arguments based on a user’s opinions
on some arguments. We evaluate our approach by crowd-
sourcing opinions from 50 participants about 30 arguments.
Note, in this paper, our user models are restricted to the
opinions they might have of arguments. Obviously, this is
just one dimension of what we ultimately require for more
sophisticated user models. Other dimensions of a user that
could be important in persuasion include personality, biases,
and emotional state of the user [18] as well as goals, com-
mitments, motivation, and past behaviour of the user [6]. We
return to these other dimensions in our discussion of related
work and future work.
In the following, we explain the methods used for acquiring
crowd-sourced opinions on arguments (Section II), analyze the
correlations between scoring criteria (Section III), investigate
the classifiers for predicting scores (Section IV-B), discuss how
these classifiers can be harnessed in modelling the persuadee
(Section V), review the related literature (Section VI) and
discuss our contributions (Section VII).
II. DATA & METHODS
In this section we describe the arguments used in the
experiment, which of their aspects the participants were asked
to judge, the methods we used for recruiting participants, and
the methods used to analyze the obtained results.
A. Arguments
For the purpose of our study, we have created a data set
consisting of 30 arguments that were split into the three
primary categories – celebrity, scientific and society – each one
of them with a particular format. Every category consisted of
10 arguments. The arguments have been presented in English.
The topics of the arguments are medicines, recycling, electric
cars, and coffee.
Celebrity arguments are of the form “Person X says Y.
Therefore, you/we should Z”, where X is a (fictional or real)
celebrity, such as an actor or a singer, Y is a claim made by
this person and Z is a possible opinion or action resulting from
this claim. For example, “Melissa Latimer, a popular health
and fitness celebrity, says that coffee can disturb the natural
rhythm of the body and cause sleeping issues. Therefore, you
should drink less coffee and replace it with healthier options,
such as green tea.”
Scientific arguments look similar to the previous ones, but
instead of using a celebrity as the “source” for a given claim,
we use the studies or reports carried out by (again, fictional or
real) scientific organizations. For example, “Extensive scien-
tific studies carried out by the Australian Government National
Health and Medical Research Council show that there is
no evidence that homeopathy is an effective treatment for
any health condition. Therefore, we should not use it as an
alternative to traditional medicine.”
Society arguments are of the form “Y. Therefore, you/we
should Z”. There is no explicit evidence for the claim Y (the
intention is to use “common knowledge”) and the argument
is meant to the reflect social pressure or the possible dangers
or benefits to the society. For example, “Vaccines are cru-
cial in building herd immunity and preventing diseases from
spreading, which is important for people with compromised
immune systems. Therefore, we should receive vaccines for
our wellbeing as well as for the people around us.”
In each category, five of the arguments are pro arguments
(i.e. arguments for something) and five of the arguments are
con arguments (i.e. arguments against something). As this
paper is not concerned with dialectical issues (i.e. with how an
opinion in an argument can change with the presentation of a
counterarguments), we do not necessarily give a con argument
for each pro argument or vice versa.
B. Criteria for judging arguments
There are various criteria for judging an argument. Its
length, formality, language, etc. can be used to estimate
its convincingness [19]. Appeals to our vanity or use of
flattery as deployed by salespeople can convince us to buy
a given product [20]. A good argument can also be seen as
one strongly grounded in facts and evidence. If we look at
dialectical semantics (e.g. [4]), then the arguments we can
defend, or even better, which are not attacked at all, are the
ones we want.
Rather than attempt to investigate too many aspects of an
argument, as a starting point we have chosen to focus on three
of them - how believable, how convincing and how appealing
an argument is. We chose these dimensions because they
provide a seemingly diverse and insightful range of notions
for evaluating an argument. Furthermore, we can easily find
arguments that have a high score in one of the aforementioned
dimensions but a low one in another, for example:
• “Smoking causes numerous diseases. Therefore, you
should quit.” On its own, this is an argument that many
smokers will believe. However, the number of people that
will actually be convinced to quit is not significant.
• “Education should be free for everyone independently of
race, gender or religion. Therefore, we should abolish
the tuition fees incurred on students by the universities.”
Many people will consider the argument very appealing.
At the same time, we can acknowledge that universities
need resources to function. There is a reason why the
tuition fees in many of the highest ranking universities
and institutes in the world force a lot of students to take
up loans. Hence, as appealing as this argument may be,
its convincingness may be much lower.
• “We have a found a tumour in your brain and, if it is left
untreated, you have a year left to live. You will eventually
develop seizures, difficulties with speech, movement and
vision and experience severe headaches. Therefore, we
would advise you to undergo a surgery to remove as
much of the tumour as possible and follow it up with
radiotherapy.” This is not a statement anyone wants to
hear. However, as unappealing it is, we consider it to
be quite convincing and it is likely that the patient will
decide to undergo the treatment to extend his life.
The examples above show that these three notions are, to
some degree, distinct. Therefore, it makes sense to ask how
far do the differences go, whether all of these dimensions
should be taken into account or, based on the correlation
between them, can one of them become a proxy for another.
We will address these issues in Section III. In future work, we
will consider further dimensions (e.g. how plausible, or how
compelling, an argument is).
C. Recruitment
In this experiment we recruited 50 participants and asked
them to score the aforementioned arguments in terms of
believability, convincingness, and appeal on the scale from
−10 to 10. No definition was given to participants of the terms
(i.e. believability, convincingness, and appeal), as we wanted
to investigate empirically the diversity ways that people may
score them. However, we did check that they had a reasonable
understanding of the general meaning of them and saw the
differences between them. For this, we presented 6 sentences
and asked the participant to complete them using words from
a list. For example:
• “We went to the store just to buy a fishing rod, but the
seller talked us into getting an extra fishing line and some
hooks. I think he is a very person” – the answer is
“convincing”.
• “My blind date turned out to be a very closed-minded
and racist person. Things like these put me off. I find
them ” – the answer is “unappealing”.
• “My 5 years old nephew said he can lift the couch over
his head. I don’t think he is telling the truth, which means
I find all of this ” – the answer is “unbelievable”.
The participants were not informed of the category (i.e.
celebrity, scientific, or society) to which a given argument was
assigned. Also, we ensured that the arguments belonging to a
single category were not presented together.
The recruitment was done using Amazon Mechanical Turk
(AMT for short) and the survey ran on Survey Monkey, which
are both common platforms for experiments of this type.
Results are available online1. In addition to the aforementioned
test, the participants were subjected to an additional language
exercise and two attention checks to ensure their skills and
honesty of their work. The language exercise was comparable
to the Cambridge English: First (FCE) qualification test in
terms of difficulty. The attention checks were meant to dis-
qualify participants who are too distracted or simply resort to
random clicking in order to complete the survey. They were
presented with two sentences (one after 10 and the other after
20 arguments) requesting them to enter particular values on
the believability, convincingness and appeal scales. We ran
the survey until 50 participants meeting our requirements were
found. This brings us to a 66% acceptability rate.
D. Methods for prediction studies
For prediction, we use the naive Bayes classifier (a well–
known method in machine learning). It is a simple approach
that often performs well in comparison with more sophisti-
cated methods. We combine it with a 5–fold cross–validation
in order to ensure the quality of each classifier we train. This
means that the data set is split into 5 non–overlapping parts,
where 4 parts are used for creating the classifier and 1 part is
used for predictions. The training and testing is then repeated
5 times in a way that every part is used for predictions only
once and every part is used for creating the classifier equally
many times. We thus obtain a vector of real and estimated data,
which is then used for creating a confusion matrix (explained
below). From it we obtain the accuracy and F1–score that are
used to judge our results. This analysis has been performed
using the e1071 and caret packages in R.
A confusion matrix is a table which compares the actual
and predicted data. The structure of a 2x2 confusion matrix is
visible in Table I. Each column represents the instances in a
predicted class while each row represents the instances in an
actual (i.e. real) class. The total number of occurrences of class
X (other than X) in the actual data is denoted with P (N ). The
predictions in which X is correctly guessed as X is referred
to as true positives (TP) and those in which it is misclassified
as not being X are referred to as false negatives (FN). The
classes that are not X but are predicted as X are called false
positives (FP). Finally, if they are correctly recognized as
different from X , we refer to them as true negatives (TN).
A number of parameters can be calculated from these values,
accuracy and F1–score in particular. Accuracy tells us how
1http://www0.cs.ucl.ac.uk/staff/a.hunter/papers/empiricalappendix.zip
Predicted
X not X
R
ea
l X TP FN = P
not X FP TN = N
TABLE I: 2x2 confusion matrix
often the classifier is correct. F1–score is calculated as the
harmonic mean of precision and recall. Precision is the chance
that a value predicted as X is really X and recall can be seen
as the chance of X being correctly predicted as X .
Accuracy = TP+TNP+N Recall =
TP
TP+FN
Precision = TPTP+FP F1 =
2×Precision×Recall
Precision+Recall
The above formulas are suitable for a 2x2 confusion matrix.
In order to obtain values for larger matrices, we proceed in
the following manner. The overall accuracy is the sum of
the diagonal values (which represent the correct predictions)
divided by the the sum of all table entries (which is the total
number of predictions). Other values are calculated per class,
which means that e.g. a matrix with columns and rows X ,
Y and Z can be transformed into three 2x2 matrices that
separately focus on predictions being X or not X (resp. Y and
not Y , Z and not Z). They can be either reported as such, or
one can calculate their averages. In our case, the average F1–
score is taken as the harmonic mean of the average precision
and recall, which are calculated in the standard way.
III. CORRELATIONS BETWEEN SCORING CRITERIA
For every two of the three listed attributes (i.e. believable,
convincing, appealing), we have calculated the (Spearman)
correlation between them for arguments belonging to the
same group and for all arguments altogether. Our findings are
presented in Table II.
These results show a very strong correlation between what
is seen as believable and convincing in all categories. Hence,
they indicate that believability is a good proxy for convinc-
ingness and therefore arguably for persuasiveness. This is an
important observation as it may allow us to focus primarily
on believability in user modelling.
There is also quite a strong correlation between how ap-
pealing and how believable or convincing a given argument
is. However, it is lower than in the previous case. We can
observe that the appeal appears to be visibly less correlated
with the other criteria in the case of scientific arguments. It is
possible that these arguments were seen as more formal and
complicated when compared to other categories. Nevertheless,
at this point we cannot say with certainty what has caused this
Category Believable -Convincing
Convincing -
Appealing
Appealing -
Believable
Celebrity 0.85 0.63 0.64
Scientific 0.89 0.50 0.46
Society 0.90 0.69 0.66
Total 0.89 0.61 0.59
TABLE II: Correlations between dimensions
Predicted
Appeal Believability Convincingness
Celebrity Scientific Society Celebrity Scientific Society Celebrity Scientific Society
R
ea
l Celebrity 44 3 3 45 4 1 43 4 3
Scientific 8 39 3 7 35 8 6 38 6
Society 7 3 40 6 7 37 4 5 41
F1–score 0.81 0.82 0.83 0.83 0.73 0.77 0.84 0.78 0.82
Accuracy 0.82 0.78 0.81
TABLE III: Confusion matrices for category predicting problem w.r.t. a given dimension
effect. We believe that further studies, that use more arguments
and divide appeal into additional dimensions, would help us
to clarify this situation.
IV. PREDICTION
From each participant we obtained in total 90 answers. By
fixing the dimension we are interested in to any of appealing,
believable or convincing, we obtain 10 scores per category
for a single person. These values can be seen as a category
profile of a participant. Some of the questions we could ask
at this point are (1) given the profile values of a person, can
we predict the category of this profile? (2) given some of the
arguments from a category, how well can we predict the values
for the remaining arguments? (3) how well can arguments from
one category predict the values in another category? In this
section we will answer these questions by training and testing
naive Bayes classifiers.
A. Prediction of categories
In this subsection we focus on how well we can predict
the category based on the profile values given to us by the
participants. Good results in this task could indicate that the
arguments inside the groups are sufficiently related in order to
be able predict their topic, similarly as the weight and height of
a person could be used for predicting whether we are dealing
with a male or a female.
For the purpose of this task, for every dimension we create
a table in which every row contains the category (celebrity,
scientific or society) and the 10 answers associated with it.
Therefore, every participant is described using three rows.
During the cross–validation stage, we have ensured that every
row of every participant is used for testing precisely once
and equally many times for training. The confusion matrices
comparing the real and the predicted categories are presented
in Table III. In this table we can also find the F1–score
associated with every class and the overall prediction accuracy.
We can observe that despite the limited number of participants,
the category recognition of a profile works quite well. In the
vast majority of cases, if a tuple of answers is predicted as
belonging to a given category, then it is in this category and
vice versa. This indicates that even though the participants are
not aware of the categorization of the arguments, there is a
certain coherence to the categories.
B. Prediction of scores for arguments
The purpose of this part of our study is to see how well
we can predict the score assigned to a given argument by a
participant. In the interests of space, we will present results
concerning only the believability of an argument. Note, we
get very similar results for convincingness (which is unsur-
prising given the strong correlation between believability and
convincingness), and we get slightly better results for appeal.
At this point every row in our data set used for creating
the classifiers now represents the beliefs of a given participant
about our 30 arguments. In order to simplify the analysis for
predicting scores, we replace the original scores in the data
by an interpretation. Hence, in this case a given argument
can be strongly believed (values from 10 to 7), believed (6
to 3), undecided (2 to -2), disbelieved (-3 to -6) or strongly
disbelieved (-7 to -10). However, please note that splitting the
values into fewer or more classes is of course possible.
1) Approaches: We first consider predicting the exact value
of an argument given other arguments from the desired cate-
gory. As a starting point, we first create three classifiers for
every argument, one in which the predictors are the other
9 arguments in its own category and two in which the 10
arguments belonging to the remaining categories are used.
We will treat the obtained results as the baseline. However,
certain arguments, despite being in the same category, might
not be as strongly related as others. This may be caused by,
for example, their topic, certain secondary characteristics or
simply by one of them being too “noisy” due to the difficulties
that the participants may have had in judging it. Therefore,
what we have done is to use only some of the arguments as
predictors and focus on the results that perform better than
our baseline either in terms of overall accuracy or average
F1–score. We call each of them a “best” classifier.
We also consider a relaxation in our predictions. For
example, misclassifying a “strongly believed” argument as
“believed” may, depending on the context, not be a severe
error. Thus, we have allowed an error margin of 1 in our
predictions, i.e. the predicted result that is at most one class
away from the actual value is seen as “satisfactory”. Thus,
we have again looked at the behaviour of our classifiers and
obtained a new baseline and the best results with an error
margin 1.
2) Findings: To summarize, we have two types of classi-
fiers per argument – baseline and best – and for each of them
we consider an error margin of 0 and of 1. The accuracy and
F1–scores associated with predicting an argument from a given
category based on other arguments in the same category can be
seen in Figure 2. Every marker on a given line represents the
value obtained by a single argument belonging to the desired
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Fig. 2: Accuracy and F1–scores of predicted scores of arguments in a given category w.r.t. this category. Each point on the
x–axis denotes an argument. For presentation purposes, the results have been ordered by increasing accuracy or F1–score w.r.t.
the baseline without margin.
Predicting category Celebrity Scientific Society
Predicted category Accuracy F1 Accuracy F1 Accuracy F1
Best
without
margin
Celebrity 0.48 0.39 0.52 0.46 0.52 0.43
Scientific 0.59 0.53 0.58 0.53 0.57 0.48
Society 0.58 0.46 0.59 0.46 0.53 0.41
Best with
margin 1
Celebrity 0.816 0.79 0.84 0.82 0.83 0.80
Scientific 0.90 0.86 0.90 0.86 0.90 0.86
Society 0.89 0.85 0.88 0.83 0.86 0.80
TABLE IV: Average accuracy and F1–scores for predicting with different categories
category. We can observe that not all arguments are equally
well predicted in the baseline case. In the science and society
categories we can find arguments that, even with the limited
size of our sample, have an accuracy above 0.6. Unfortunately,
we can also encounter arguments with accuracy lower than 0.2,
which means that the chance of getting the correct score w.r.t.
the baseline may be worse than if we were to use a random
guess. Fortunately, in all of the cases we can find a classifier
using only a subset of the predictors that performs better than
the baseline. Similar observations can be made in the case
of F1–score. By allowing the classifier to be off by a single
class (i.e. we use error margin of 1) we obtain a baseline
that performs even better than the best predictions without
any margins. For certain arguments, by improving upon this
baseline we can even reach accuracy of 1.
In Table IV we can find the best average accuracy and the
best average F1–scores of predictions made for arguments in
category X by arguments in category Y . We can observe
that the scientific arguments appear to be easier to predict
than others and that they tend to serve as better predictors as
well. This information is particularly valuable, as obtaining
and verifying such arguments appears to be less difficult than
in the case of other categories. Moreover, we can expect that
the credibility and general opinion of a given scientific institute
may be more stable when compared to e.g. the popularity of
a given celebrity. This means that the quality of such a data
source should not overly decrease with time.
V. USING PREDICTION IN PERSUADEE MODELLING
The methods and results in this paper show that it is possible
to gather data from a set of participants on their scores (e.g.
belief, convincingness, appeal) for each set of arguments, and
use this data to train the classifiers using off-the-shelf software.
This can prove useful in strategic argumentation, particularly
when it comes to creating the user models and deciding which
arguments should or should not be put forward by the system
during a dialogue. If the dialogue is preceded by a profiling
phase in which we find out more about a particular user, then
by knowing which arguments serve as good predictors we can
limit the number of questions the system needs to ask. This
may be advantageous if the dialogue concerns a sensitive topic,
and the user is reluctant to reveal too much information, or
the system is concerned that the user might disengage if the
dialogue involves too many questions.
The predicted belief scores can be harnessed by the epis-
temic approach to probabilistic argumentation, where the
degree to which an argument is believed is derived from a
probability distribution over the subsets of arguments [8]–[10],
[12]. For an argument A, P (A) > 0.5 represents A is believed
to some degree, P (A) = 0.5 represents A is neither believed
nor disbelieved, and P (A) < 0.5 represents A is disbelieved to
some degree. Although the model of the user is a probability
distribution over the power set of arguments in the argument
graph, not over single arguments, given a tuple of answers by
a participant and classifiers for argument A1, . . . , An that may
predict that the believability of each Ai ∈ {A1, . . . , An} as
ki, it is straightforward to identify a probability distribution
P such that for each Ai, P (Ai) = ki. Furthermore, taking
the structure of the graph into account, we may choose
to assume rationality constraints (postulates) on satisfying
probability distributions, and then use distance-based methods
for minimally changing a probability distribution in order to
satisfy the set of postulates [11].
As we discussed earlier, our framework for persuasion has
so far been based on taking the user’s beliefs in arguments
into account when choosing moves [3], [12], [16]. However,
we can harness the further dimensions of the user’s opinion
of convincingness and appeal by taking an aggregation of the
three dimensions (e.g. a weighted average) in our decision-
theoretic framework [16].
VI. RELATED WORK
Most proposals for persuasion in dialogical argumentation
focus on protocols (for a review see [21]). Some strategies
have been investigated (e.g. [22]–[25]) but there are relatively
few proposals that formalize user modelling. A probabilistic
model of the opponent has been used in a strategy allowing
the selection of moves based on what it believes the other
agent is aware of [26]. The history of previous dialogues has
been used to predict the arguments that an opponent might put
forward [27]. For modelling dialogues, a probabilistic finite
state machine can represent the possible moves that each agent
can make in each state of the dialogue, and this has been
generalized to partially observable Markov decision processes
(POMDPs) when there is uncertainty about what an opponent
is aware of [28]. However, none of these proposals consider
the beliefs of the opposing agent. In [29], a planning system
has been used by the persuader to optimize the choice of
arguments based on what premises are believed. However,
there is no consideration of how the beliefs are obtained or
how they updated during the dialogue.
In an empirical study, Rosenfeld and Kraus [30] (and
extended in [31], [32]) undertook an experiment in order to
develop a machine learning-based approach to predict the next
move a participant would make in a dialogue. The machine
learning models were trained on data that incorporated the
sequences of arguments in a dialogue that the participants
accept. Once trained, the models were able to predict the ac-
ceptance an unseen case would have. However, this work only
concerned whether the participants in their studies regarded
arguments as acceptable or not, and it did not consider how
the participants viewed the individual arguments. Therefore, it
does not allow for a model of the user to be constructed that,
for instance, modelled the degree to which the user believes an
argument. Hence, it does not allow for a probabilistic model
to be extracted that could be used in a decision-theoretic
framework for strategic argumentation (such as our decision-
theoretic framework [16]) .
There are some studies of computational models of ar-
gument with participants by Rahwan et al [33] and Cerruti
et al [34] that investigate reinstatement. These studies were
aimed at investigating how well existing argumentation theo-
ries performed in describing user behaviour. The users were
presented several argument graphs and were asked to explain
how acceptable a given argument is in their opinion. The
results show that in some cases, the implicit knowledge about
domains can substantially affect the given acceptability levels.
However, more importantly, the experiments show that the
attacked argument’s acceptability is lowered, but does not
fall to 0, which is what would be predicted by the usual
dialectical semantics for abstract argumentation. Additionally,
introducing the defense for this argument raises its acceptabil-
ity. However, typically it does not reach the value of 1, which is
the level the usual dialectical semantics would predict. These
studies lend support for using a finer grained representation
of belief/disbelief, but they do not provide a framework for
constructing the user models that can be directly harnessed in
argumentation systems.
There are user studies that investigate the persuasiveness of
arguments. Lukin et al [35] have shown that with some audi-
ences, emotional arguments are more effective in persuasion
than factual arguments. For this, they categorized audiences
according to the OCEAN personality traits (i.e. openness
to experience, extroversion, agreeableness, conscientiousness,
and neuroticism). Then in a user study on the persuasiveness of
healthy eating messages [36], positively framed messages (e.g.
Most people believe that eating a healthy breakfast contributes
to a longer lifespan) were shown to be more persuasive
than negatively framed messages (e.g. Most people believe
that eating an unhealthy breakfast contributes to a shorter
lifespan). Furthermore, Cialdini’s principles of persuasion [20]
were considered (i.e. reciprocation, commitment, consensus,
liking, authority, and scarcity), and it was found that arguments
that appeal to authority (e.g. Studies conducted by health
experts have shown that eating a healthy breakfast keeps you
energized) were shown to be the most persuasive.
VII. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, we have developed and evaluated methods for
acquiring crowd-sourced opinions on arguments, and shown
how they can be used for predicting opinions on arguments.
This shows how it is viable to acquire data to construct
classifiers, and that these can then be deployed to substantially
decrease the number of questions that need to be asked of a
user. In future work, we will use the methods in this paper for
training classifiers on arguments concerning two case-studies
we are developing in behaviour change in healthcare.
Two main approaches to probabilistic argumentation are
the epistemic approach (discussed in Section I) and the con-
stellations approach (e.g. [37], [38]). The epistemic approach
captures belief in arguments, and as discussed in Section
V, can be used to represent and reason with the predicted
scores. The constellations approach captures uncertainty in the
structure of the graph (formalized by a probability distribution
over the subgraphs). It would be interesting to extend the
methods in this paper to predict probability distributions for
the constellations approach.
The work in this paper is a starting point for further
experiments. In particular, we would like to investigate further
judging criteria. For instance, emotion in argumentation has
been studied with participants in a debate where the emotional
state was estimated from EEG data and automated facial ex-
pression analysis [39]. They showed, for example, that during
the dialogue, the number and the strength of arguments and
the relations between them could be correlated with particular
emotions of the participants. Requesting the participants to
state their emotional reactions to the presented arguments
could help us in improving our predictions.
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